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RACE AND THE DOCTRINE OF SELF DEFENSE: THE ROLE OF RACE IN
DETERMINING THE PROPER USE OF FORCE TO PROTECT ONESELF
Richard Klein*
A valid and appropriate use of self-defense justifies the use of force against
another, even when such force results in death.1 But the force used must have been
absolutely necessary in order to protect oneself, it cannot have been used as form of selfhelp or as a display of vindictiveness to retaliate against an individual who may be
standing as a symbol for a group that has treated an individual in negative, hostile ways
in the past. When Bernhard Goetz shot at 4 black youths in a subway car,2 was it because
he truly believed such an action was necessary in order to protect himself from the
infliction of serious harm? And if indeed such was his personal belief, is that sufficient
to justify his shootings or does the law require that the belief be a reasonable one
supported by an objective standard? When John White shot and killed Daniel Cicciaro3
did he have a valid self-defense based, in part, on his knowledge of the lynching’s and
attacks on blacks in the southern parts of the U.S. in prior decades?
Self-defense is classified as a necessity defense,4 the individual claiming the
defense must have had no available option but to attack the person who created the threat.
And, as the Model Penal Code makes clear, the force that was used must have been
“immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself.”5 It is generally required
that there must have been an overt act by the threatening individual that presented an
imminent danger to the person who is claiming self-defense.6 Any desire by an
*Bruce Gould Distinguished Professor of Law, Touro Law School; J.D., Harvard, 1972. The author wishes
to express his gratitude to his extraordinarily competent research assistants, Joseph Indusi and Andrew
Bernstein.
1
An Act which causes the death of another may be deemed to be justifiable self-defense if done to protect
one’s own life. See, e.g., People v. Randle, 111 P.3d 987, 994 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a killing done in
perfect self-defense is not murder or manslaughter, but justifiable homicide).
2
People v. Goetz, 479 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1986).
3
Corey Kilgannon, Jury Convicts Man Who Shot Teenager During Driveway Confrontation, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2008, available at 2007 WLNR 26196645.
4
The original language used in the 1964 New York State legislative study bill regarding self-defense used
the standard necessity concepts of lesser and greater evils. Self-defense would apply when such “conduct
is necessary to avoid a public or private injury or evil greater than that sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense charged.” Commission Staff Notes, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (2009). The Model
Penal Code provides that there is a valid necessity defense when “the harm or evil sought to be avoided by
such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged” MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962).
5
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (emphasis added).
6
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(a) (West 2008) (“[T]he use of force upon or toward another person is
justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(a) (West 2008) (“The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable
when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself
against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”). State v. Norman, 378
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individual to use force to punish someone else for conduct others of his race may have
previously engaged in, voids the claim of self-defense. A vigilante who feels the need to
take the law into his own hands is a criminal. The desire to retaliate to make amends for
past wrongs may be understandable, but our criminal justice system speaks clearly and in
one voice: No citizen is to act as judge and jury and inflict punishment. Enforcement of
the law and dealing with those who are violating the laws are for the police and the police
alone.
Self-defense has been recognized as a valid defense throughout the history of our
laws. Blackstone’s Commentaries reports that “for the one uniform principle that runs
through our own, and all other laws, seems to be this: that where a crime, in itself capital,
is endeavored to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force by the death of the
party attempting.”7 The defense applied to a threat of assault, not just a potential killing:
“The defense . . . is that whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the like,
in the course of a sudden brawl or quarrel, by killing him who assaults him.”8 And in
New York, the penal statutes have, since 1829, codified the common law right to use
physical force in self-defense.9
Self-defense is generally considered to be, as it is in New York State, a
Justification defense.10 Whereas defenses, which are labeled as Justifications, absolve the
individual actor from any criminal liability for his conduct, the defenses considered to be
Excuses have traditionally not led to the defendant’s release from liability.11 But the use
of the phrase “justification” ought not to be interpreted as the criminal justice system’s
approval of what had been done, but only that the conduct engaged in was understandable
and will be tolerated without sanction. The presence of justification does not in any way
negate an element of the crime with which the defendant has been charged.12
The New York State Justification statute provides that an individual may use
“physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes
such to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third person from what he or she
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such
other person[.]”13 Deadly physical force can be used only to defend oneself against the
use of deadly physical force of another.14 It may at times become an issue for the jury to
S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989) (“The right to kill in self-defense is based on the necessity . . . to kill [in order] to
save oneself from imminent death or great bodily harm.”).
7
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *181 (1765-1769).
8
Id. at *184.
9
1829 REV. STAT. OF N.Y., Part IV, Ch 1, Tit. II, § 3.
10
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (2009).
11
J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y. 1, 2-3 (1956-1957) as
republished SANFORD H. KADISH ET. AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 738 (8th ed. 2007)
(Hereinafter KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW.)
12
KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW at 737.
13
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (2009).
14
Id. at §35.15(2)(a).
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determine whether the actor was truly confronted with the use of physical force that
would be considered to be “deadly.” The New York State Penal Law defines such force
as constituting “physical force which, under the circumstances in which it is used, as
readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.”15 As we shall see, the
distinction between the accused use of deadly versus non-deadly force is crucial as to the
obligation by the defendant to have retreated prior to the use of force.16
The Model Penal Code emphasizes the import of the defendant’s intentions when
assessing whether or not he was using deadly force: “A threat to cause death or serious
bodily harm, by the production of a weapon or otherwise, as long as the actor’s purpose is
limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly physical force if necessary,
does not constitute deadly force.”17 The New York Penal Laws, however, do not provide
for such an interpretation based upon an evaluation of the motives of the individual who
threatens another with the use of deadly physical force.
The most problematic requirement for one who is claiming self-defense is the
need to show that the threat that was being responded to was an “imminent” one.
Imminent is generally thought of as immediate; if the threat confronting the accused had
been the use of future force, there was no immediate threat and self-defense does not
apply.18 If one acts in a pre-emptive manner to avoid even certain harm that will occur at
a later date, self-defense is inapplicable.19 In this respect, the law of self-defense is
analogous to the requirements for the use of any other necessity defense.20
15

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (11) (2009). The Model Penal Code defines deadly force as that which is used
of the purpose of “causing or that he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily
injury.” MODEL PENAL CODE, § 3.11(2) (1962).
16
See e.g., People v. Kruger, 603 N.E.2d 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 610 N.E.2d. 1270 (Ill.
1993).
17
MODEL PENAL CODE §3.11(2) (1962).
18
People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
19
Id. at 173.
20
State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989) (“The right to kill in self-defense is based on the
necessity, real or reasonably apparent, of killing an unlawful aggressor to save oneself from imminent death
or great bodily harm at his hands.”) (emphasis added). The North Carolina Supreme Court held that in
spite of the fact the victim had a history of assaulting his wife at any time, there was no imminent threat
existing at the time that the defendant killed her husband and therefore, the trial judge had committed no
error in failing to charge the jurors on the law of self-defense. Id. at 16. In addition to evidence presented
regarding the mental abuse by her husband due to alcoholism, evidence was presented that she sustained
regular assaults and beatings, including, “slapping, punching and kicking her, striking her with various
objects, and throwing glasses, beer bottles and other objects at her.” Id. at 10. The defendant described
other specific incidents of abuse, such as her husband putting her cigarettes out on her, throwing hot coffee
on her, breaking glass against her face and crushing food on her face.” Id. Further testimony revealed that
“her husband did not work and forced her to make money by prostitution, and that he made humor of that
fact to family and friends…He routinely called the defendant ‘dog,’ ‘bitch,’ and ‘whore,’ and on a few
occasions made her eat pet food out of the pets’ bowls and bark like a dog.” Id. He often made her sleep
on the floor, and at times, he deprived her of food and refused to let her get food for the family. During
those years of abuse, the defendant’s husband threatened numerous times to kill her and to maim her in
various ways. Id. at 9-10. See also Commonwealth v. Sands, 553 S.E.2d 733, 737 (Va. 2001) (refusing to
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Were the threats against Goetz and White truly “imminent”? To the extent that
there has been any relaxing of the requirement that the threat be an imminent one, it has
occurred in the context of the use of the battered woman’s syndrome.21 It has been found
that in 20% of the cases in which a battered woman kills her accuser, there was no direct
confrontation occurring at the time of the murder.22 In fact, 8% of the time the murdered
husband had actually been sleeping.23 But law reformers and women’s advocacy groups
attacked the requirement of an imminent threat as being too restricting for the unique
position that many women found themselves to be in.24 A repeatedly battered woman
may well be one who fears that the next attack could occur at any time; there was, so to
speak, always the threat of an immediate attack.25
Were the threats against Goetz and White truly imminent or were the shootings by
these men just a release of long-standing pent-up anger and hostility based, in part, on
race? Were the shootings attempts to retaliate for past abuses that they or their families
suffered from blacks (in the case of Bernard Goetz) or whites (in the case of John
White)?
An additional requirement for a valid self-defense is that the force used by the
actor not have been excessive.26 Whereas it may have been appropriate and justified for
an individual to have used deadly force to protect himself, was the force used in a manner
that was disproportionate to the threat? Would a use of lesser force have accomplished
the goal of protecting oneself? Did Goetz need to fire the fifth shot at Darryl Cabey, one
of the would-be robbers who at that time was sitting at the end seat of the subway car?27
Was it necessary for John White to have brought his 32 caliber Beretta out of his house
and point it at the youths who had come to his home?28

instruct the jurors as to self defense because the “evidence fails to reveal any overt act by [the defendant’s]
husband that presented an imminent danger at the time of the shooting.”).
21
See, e.g., State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App.
1986).
22
Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform
Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 397 (1991).
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984) (stating that expert testimony regarding battered
woman’s syndrome is “relevant to the reasonableness of defendant’s belief that she was in imminent danger
of death or serious injury.”).
25
Id. at 376-78. The Court held that the expert may help the jury to realize that the battered wife “is
particularly able to predict accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her.” Id. at 378.
26
See, State v. Clay, 256 S.E.2d 176 (N.C. 1979) (holding that any force greater than that which is
necessary to protect oneself from an assault will be deemed excessive as a matter of law); People v.
Colecchia, 674 N.Y.S.2d 10 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998) (holding that once the threat of deadly physical
force dissipates, the use of deadly physical force is excessive), appeal denied, 702 N.E.2d 844 (N.Y. 1998);
People v. Stephenson, 571 N.E.2d 943 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 130 (Ill. 1991).
27
Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43 (N.Y. 1986).
28
Kilgannon, supra note 3.

Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center

34
Journal of Race, Gender and Ethnicity
Volume 4, Issue 3 – November 2009

If any one of the elements for the justification of self-defense fails, the defense is
not valid.29 The threat against the individual must have been one with the potential of
causing serious physical injury, the threat must have been an immediate one and the force
used in defense must not have been excessive.30 Once the threat no longer exists, the
necessity to use force has ended.31 In People v. Kruger,32 the court held that the right to
use self-defense had terminated once the attacker had been shot and incapacitated
because there was no longer any threat.33 The second shot, which was fired, therefore,
was not done in self-defense.34
In New York State, self-defense is deemed to be an ordinary defense.35 Defenses,
on the other hand, that are considered to be Excuses and not Justification defenses are
labeled affirmative defenses.36 The distinction is one of great import. For self-defense,
the prosecutor has the burden of disproving the claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt.37 Whenever the defendant has submitted evidence of self-defense, the court must
then rule whether, as a matter of law, the defendant’s claimed facts if established would
constitute self-defense.38 The Court is required to view the evidence in the light which is
most favorable to the accused.39 There is no common law approach in New York to the
defense, the requirements of Penal Law § 35.15 control.40 If the defendant has raised a
colorable claim of self-defense, the judge has the obligation to instruct the jury as to the
requirements needed to establish the defense.41 The justification charge that is required is
29

Patrasso v. Nelson, 121 F.3d 297, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 302 (citing People v. Zolidis, 450 N.E.2d 1290, 1294 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983))
31
Rorie v. United States, 882 A.2d 763, 771 (D.C. 2005).
32
603 N.E.2d 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
33
Id. at 745.
34
Id.
35
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (2009).
36
See Peter H. Lagonikos, Affirmative Defenses Under New York’s Penal Law, 1998 No. 27 N.Y. Crim. L.
News 1 (1998). See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (2009) (stating that it is an affirmative defense that the
actor “lacked criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect …”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00
(2009) (stating that it is an affirmative defense if “the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because
he was coerced to do so …”); See also, N.Y. PENAL LAW §25.00 (2009) (stating that the statutory
affirmative defenses shift the burden to the defendant to establish the defense by a preponderance of the
evidence).
37
People v. Steele, 260 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1970).
38
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05(2) (2009).
39
People v. McManus, 496 N.E.2d 202, 207 (N.Y. 1986).
40
People v. Magliato, 496 N.E.2d 856, 857 (N.Y. 1986).
41
See People v. Khan, 502 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the trial court erred in refusing to charge
the jury regarding justification); People v. Dare, 562 N.Y.S.2d 251 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1991) (holding
that assault, a crime involving the use of force, warranted the justification charge when evidence was
introduced to support it), appeal denied, 586 N.E.2d 67 (1991); People v. Jones, 538 N.Y.S.2d 876 (App.
Div. 2d Dep’t 1989) (holding that it was reversible error to omit the jury instruction permitting the jury to
determine whether the force used by the defendant was deadly); People v. Suarez, 539 N.Y.S.2d 325 (App.
Div. 1st Dep’t 1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving justification defense when the defendants
testimony supported self-defense); People v. Ortiz, 381 N.Y.S.2d 682 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1976) (holding
that the trial court erred in not giving justification charge because portions of both the defense and
prosecution evidence could have been believed).
30
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to include an explanation of the burden of the prosecution to disprove the validity of the
defense.42 The failure of the trial judge in New York to give the jury a justification
charge is not to be deemed as mere harmless error.43
Some states hold it is not reversible error for the trial judge to fail to give the
charge for self-defense if the defendant has not made a request for the jury instruction or
has not presented evidence indicating self-defense.44 In California, it is considered to be
reversible error to fail to give the charge for imperfect self-defense when evidence has
been introduced to support the defense.45 Where self-defense is deemed to be an
affirmative defense, the defendant may raise the defense only if he or the State presents
evidence in support of the necessary elements of the defense.46
The burden for proving self-defense also varies according to jurisdiction. In some
states, self-defense is designated as an affirmative defense that places the burden on the
defendant to prove he or she acted in self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.47
The United Stated Supreme Court, in Martin v. Ohio,48 upheld the constitutionality of
requiring the defendant to prove self-defense by preponderance for the evidence; such a
requirement was found not to violate Due Process.49 Most jurisdictions follow the New
York approach: self-defense must be disproved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt
once evidence is introduced relating to self-defense.50 The New Jersey Supreme Court in
State v. Gardner,51 however, has ruled that it is erroneous to place the burden on the
defendant: “Once [the] proof appears either in the State’s case or defendant’s case in
support of an allegation of self-defense, the State has the burden of proving that the
defense is untrue. And that the State must do so beyond a reasonable doubt.”52
Similarly, a California jury instruction in People v. Cornett53 regarding self-defense was
42

People v. Fermin, 828 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548-49 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2007), withdrawn, 868 N.E.2d 239
(N.Y. 2007).
43
People v. Young, 825 N.Y.S.2d 147, 151 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2006), appeal denied, 866 N.E.2d 465
(N.Y. 2007)
44
State v. Johnson, 234 N.W. 263, 264-65 (Iowa 1931).
45
See, e.g., People v. Michaels, 49 P.3d 1032 (Cal. 2002) (holding that imperfect self-defense is not an
affirmative defense for murder; the claimed version of the facts would establish the elements of voluntary
manslaughter), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1058 (2003). See also Aris, supra note 18, at 1192 (stating that
substantial evidence of self-defense must be raised in order for the judge to give the instruction to the jury.)
46
People v. Anderson, 601 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (Ill.
1992).
47
State v. Gillespie, 874 N.E.2d 870, 873 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007), See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2901.05(A) (West 2008) (“The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense, and
the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused.”).
48
480 U.S. 228 (1987).
49
Id. at 233-34.
50
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walker, 820 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Mass. 2005). See also State v. Singleton, 906
A.2d 725 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (stating that the only burden on the defendant is production).
51
242 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1968).
52
Id. at 6.
53
198 P.2d 877 (Cal. 1948).
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determined to be erroneous when the burden was placed on the defendant.54 The jury
should have been instructed that the homicide is to be found to have been justified if the
evidence as self-defense raises a reasonable doubt of guilt.55 South Carolina, however,
departs from the majority and requires the defendant to prove by the greater weight of the
evidence that he acted in self-defense.56
Courts and legislatures throughout the country have wrestled with the standard to
be used in assessing whether or not the accused acted reasonably when he concluded that
he was being threatened with the imminent use of deadly physical force. Should there be
a subjective standard, wherein self-defense would be warranted as long as that particular
individual believed he was threatened? Or, should the standard be an objective one, and
only if a reasonable person would have felt threatened would the defense be appropriate.
The courts at three different levels in New York considered this issue in the
Bernhard Goetz case. The New York State Supreme Court judge who was assigned to be
the trial judge for Goetz considered a motion by the defendant to dismiss the Grand Jury
indictment because of an incorrect instruction provided by the prosecutor as to the
appropriate standard to be used in assessing the claim by Goetz that he was confronted
with an imminent threat.57
As was stated by Judge Crane, “[t]he case presents a challenging question”58 and
the context arises from “one of the most difficult criminal cases of our generation”59
which has “galvanized the world.”60 The prosecutor had told the grand jurors that
So there’s both a subjective and objective element to this. First
of all, you have to determine whether the defendant, in his own
mind, believed he was in the kind of peril that permitted him to
use deadly physical force. You must also then determine whether
his response was reasonable under the circumstances, whether
that was the action – the response was the action that he – that a
reasonable man who found himself in the defendant’s situation
and if it was unreasonably excessive or – or otherwise
unjustifiable it – then the defense, would not be made out and the
third element is retreat.61
54

Id. at 885.
Id. Self-defense must be disproved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury instruction
contained the words “absolutely necessary” in reference to the elements of self-defense. The court on
appeal held this to be prejudicial, possibly causing the jurors to believe the force must have been “actually
necessary.” Id. at 881-82
56
See, e.g., State v. McDowell, 249 S.E.2d 916 (S.C. 1978).
57
People v. Goetz, 502 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1986).
58
Id. at 578.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 580.
55
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The defendant maintained that the italicized language above incorrectly conveyed an
objective standard.62 Whereas the prosecutor contended that the hybrid standard was
appropriate, Goetz maintained that the appropriate standard ought to be fully a subjective
one.63 Were the prosecutor’s statement on this issue to be incorrect, the indictment would
have to be dismissed.
The Court cited the following language for a requested justification charge which
is contained in the New York Defender Digest: “The test the law requires you to use in
deciding what this defendant was reasonably justified in believing is what this defendant
himself, subjectively, had reason to believe – not what yourself or some other person
might reasonably believe.”64 The Court concluded that indeed the prosecutor’s
explanation of the law regarding the justification defense was error and that “the error
impaired the integrity of the Grand Jury and prejudiced defendant.”65 The Court did,
however, provide permission to the prosecutor to resubmit the case to another grand
jury.66
The Office of the Manhattan District Attorney appealed Judge Crane’s order
dismissing the nine counts of the indictment against Goetz.67 Three months later, the
First Department of the New York State Appellate Division considered the matter.68
Once again, language was used to highlight the import of the Goetz prosecution: “This
appeal poses a critical legal issue in a most significant criminal case.”69 The court found
it necessary to cut through the “confusion”70 and “the rhetoric”71 and the “media
sensationalism”72 and “heat”73 that have surrounded the matter.
The Appellate Division once again focused on the need for the grand jurors to
have realized that it was the subjective state of mind of the defendant that was of crucial
import.74 It was the moral culpability of the defendant that determined liability,75 and it
was improper to resort to the standard of the reasonable person used in civil cases
involving claims of negligence.76 The prosecutor’s instruction to the grand jurors was not
62

Goetz, 502 N.Y.S. 2d at 581.
Id.
64
Id. at 583
65
Id. at 584.
66
Id. at 585.
67
People v. Goetz, 501 N.Y.S.2d 326 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1986).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Goetz, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 318.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 323.
63
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a fair statement of the law of self-defense, and the indictment needed to be dismissed.77
An angry dissenting opinion maintained that the court’s ruling would give “legal excuse
to any hot-tempered individual, fearful neurotic or simply excessively self-righteous
person who rashly uses deadly force.”78
The Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York State, reinstated the
indictment against Goetz.79 The prosecutor’s explanation to the grand jurors about the
appropriate standard was correct.80 The law in New York was clearly laid out: The first
task of the jurors would be to determine whether the defendant believed that the deadly
force was necessary to protect himself from an imminent use of deadly force against
him.81 If such a finding were to be made, then the jury is to assess whether those beliefs
of the defendant were reasonable, could a reasonable person in light of all the existing
circumstances have maintained such a belief.82
Some states have attempted to deal with the objective/subjective dilemma by
creating what is referred to as an imperfect self-defense.83 The perfect self-defense
applies if a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed he was in
imminent danger.84 Such a defense justifies the response of the defendant to the threat
and an acquittal of the charges is to result.85 The imperfect self-defense applies when the
defendant did have an honest belief that he was being threatened, but such belief was not
considered by the trier of fact to have been a reasonable one.86 The impact of such an
imperfect self-defense is not to acquit the defendant, but rather serves to act in
mitigation.87 A murder charge will typically be reduced to manslaughter if an imperfect
self-defense is found.88
The most common instance that leads to the imperfect self-defense charge is when
the defendant’s perception of the threat meets the test under the subjective prong and not
the objective prong.89 If there is no such a charge informing jurors of the existence of an
77

Goetz, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 331-32.
Id. at 341-42 (Asch, J., dissenting).
79
People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
80
Id. at 52.
81
Id.
82
Id. The decision of the court was a unanimous one and was written by the Chief Judge of the Court, Sol
Wachtler. See id. at 98.
83
See, e.g., Faulkner v. State, 458 A.2d 81 (Md. 1983), aff’d, 483 A.2d 759 (Md. 1984).
84
Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 47.
85
State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1147 (Md. 2004).
86
In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 575 (Cal. 1994).
87
State v. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d 247, 256 (Kan. 2008).
88
See, e.g., Richmond v. State, 623 A.2d 630, 632 (Md. 1993). Maryland only allowed imperfect selfdefense to mitigate a murder charge until recently when Richmond was overruled by Christian v. State, 951
A.2d 832 (Md. 2008) (holding that imperfect self-defense will mitigate a charge of first degree assault).
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imperfect self-defense, the defendant will be guilty of murder because the “perfect” selfdefense will fail.90 For example, in State v. Shaw,91 the defendant wanted a jury
instruction for imperfect self-defense, however the state of Vermont does not allow for
this charge and a murder conviction resulted.92 California, however, recognizes
imperfect self-defense to be a mitigating factor if it is found that the defendant had a
sincere belief that he or she was in imminent danger of death or serious physical injury
but this belief was determined to have been unreasonable.93 In Christian S.,94 alleged
members of a California gang harassed the defendant for over a year, and in response, the
fearful defendant started carrying a pistol.95 On one occasion, there was a dispute
concerning damage to a truck, and the defendant drew his weapon as the victim
continued to approach him; the victim taunted the defendant and dared him to shoot.96
The defendant shot and killed the victim from twenty feet away.97 The defense claimed
that however unreasonable the killing might appear to be, the defendant did have an
honest fear of imminent death or serious physical injury which therefore served to negate
the element of malice required for murder.98 The defense contended that at most a
conviction of voluntary manslaughter would be warranted.99 The California Supreme
Court held that a charge of imperfect self-defense should be permitted.100 The Court held
that if the defendant honestly believed that he was shooting because of an imminent fear
of death or serious physical injury, the murder charge should be reduced to manslaughter
because even though the shooting was intentional, the imperfect self-defense negated the
element of malice required for a conviction of murder.101
In Pennsylvania, the statue is clear: “[A] person who intentionally or knowingly
kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he
believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the killing … but
his belief is unreasonable.”102 The Model Penal Code allows for mitigation but not
justification of a murder charge if the defendant had a subjective but mistaken belief
regarding a threat and was “reckless or negligent in having such belief or acquiring or
failing to acquire any knowledge or belief which is material to the justifiability of his use
of force….”103
90

State v. Shaw, 721 A.2d 486, 491-92 (Vt. 1998).
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Id. at 575.
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Some States permit an imperfect self-defense jury instruction to be given to the
jury when the defendant fails to meet one element required for a “perfect” self-defense.104
In Swann v. U.S.,105 the D.C. Court of Appeals allowed the charge when the defendant
was the initial aggressor (which negates the applicability of self-defense) but acted due to
a subjective fear of imminent death or serious physical injury.106 The Court determined
that “a defendant’s actual belief both in the presence of danger and in the need to resort to
force, even if one or both beliefs be objectively unreasonable, constitutes a legally
sufficient mitigating factor to warrant a finding of voluntary manslaughter rather than
second degree murder.”107
New York State law imposes a major restriction on the use of self-defense. An
individual cannot use deadly force to defend oneself if “knows that with complete safety
to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating.”108
Could Bernhard Goetz have retreated from the threat, if indeed such a threat existed, by
merely proceeding to move from one car to another in the subway train that he and the
four youths were in?109 Could he have waited for the subway to arrive at a station and
then exited onto the platform? Could John White have left the scene of the confrontation
with the four youths and retreated into his house and locked the door and called the
police?110
The doctrine of retreat can be traced back to English common law.111 Deadly
force was permitted to be used only when an individual had his “back to the wall.”112 It
was initially required that one had to have attempted to flee the scene altogether; if that
proved impossible, one must attempt to get as far away as possible from the enemy –
force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
such person on the present occasion.”).
104
See, e.g., State v. Larry, 481 S.E.2d. 907 (N.C. 1997) (“[i]mperfect self-defense renders a defendant
guilty of at least voluntary manslaughter if the first two elements above exist at the time of the killing but
the defendant, without murderous intent, either was the aggressor in bringing on the affray or used
excessive force.”), cert. denied, 552 F.3d 356 (2009).
105
648 A.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
106
Id. at 932.
107
Id. at 931.
108
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (N.Y. 2009).
109
Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43.
110
See Kilgannon, supra note 3.
111
Jason W. Bobo, Following the Trend, Alabama Abandons the Duty to Retreat and Encourages Citizens
to Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 346 (2008). (“At the core of Blackstone’s view was the
centuries-long English common-law tradition that supported the idea of all homicides as public wrongs.”
Id. at 341. Therefore, in order to avoid any use of force that may lead to a death, one had the obligation to
retreat. Id. at 342).
112
Id. at 342. Professor Richard Maxwell Brown describes the “back to the wall” test: When another
person attacks you, you must not defend yourself with violence until you have attempted to flee from the
scene. If you were unable to flee from the scene, you must retreat as far as possible from your enemy until
the wall is at your back. Then, and only then, may you legally face your opponent and kill him in selfdefense. Even with the wall at your back, there must be the need to save yourself from grievous harm. Id.
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until one’s back was up against the wall.113 It was only at that time, were the threat to
still be continuing, that one may use force in self-defense.114 The long-standing common
law exception to the obligation to retreat if assault--and not murder--was the charge
against the defendant, was changed in New York by statute requiring retreat before selfdefense in any instance could be claimed.115
The provisions of the Model Penal Code, which relate to retreat, are virtually
identical to those in New York.116 There are, however great difficulties in the application
of the retreat doctrine. First, the test is a subjective one.117 An actor is required to have
known that he had the option of a completely safe retreat.118 But how can the prosecutor
be expected to show that the defendant actually had such knowledge and that, therefore,
the use of deadly force was not necessary? The fact-finders are not to apply a reasonable
person standard and assume, therefore, that this defendant knew of the retreat option.119
Any charge to the jury that indicates that an objective standard is to be used is improper
and if a conviction results subsequent to such an instruction by the court, it will be
overturned.120 Certainly, if the defendant were to testify at trial, he will claim that he
never believed that he could just leave the scene with complete safety.
And, indeed it is “complete” safety that is required.121 In State v. Anderson,122 the
Supreme Court of Connecticut overturned the defendant’s conviction because the judge’s
instructions to the jury had failed to use the words “complete safety.”123 In the common
situation where the aggressor possesses a gun and is threatening its use, how can a jury
determine that the defendant knew he could retreat from the threat in complete safety?
Because, in part, of these practical concerns, there has recently been a steady trend in the
number of states which are abolishing the retreat requirement.124
It was in Ohio, in 1876, where the “true man” concept originated.125 A “true
man” is not a coward who retreats from a confrontation; a “true man” stands his ground
and uses the force required to meet the threat.126 It has not been the courts that have led
113
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State v. Saunders, 838 A.2d 186, 194 (Conn. 2004), cert. denied, 124 U.S. 2113 (2004).
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Id. at 1155.
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State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tenn. 1995).
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the way to the departures from the requirement of retreat. In a two-year period, the
legislatures of fifteen states have enacted what are commonly referred to as “stand your
ground laws.”127 The National Rifle Association has aggressively lobbied for abolition of
the retreat requirement and these efforts have led a total of 30 states in the years 20052007 to consider changing their laws on self-defense.128 A spokesperson for the National
Rifle Association justified its support for the anti-retreat legislation in that law-abiding
citizens should know that “if they make a decision to save their lives in the split second
they are being attacked, the law is on their side.”129
The new statutes are often shaped by the “Stand Your Ground” laws enacted in
Florida in 2005.130 The new legislation is clear. If an individual is attacked in a place
where he has a right to be, then he has “no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or
her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably
believes it is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or
another.”131
Even in those states such as New York that still adhere to the retreat doctrine,
there is an exception provided for one who is in his own home at the time of the threat.132
Justice Cardozo, in the 1914 case of People v. Tomlins,133 explained the rationale:
“It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling is
bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack. He is
under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home.”134
In New York State, as is true in virtually every state as well as the Model Penal
Code, the initial aggressor in the conflict cannot claim a justified use of self-defense.135
Whereas there often is not a clarification within the penal codes as to what exactly
designates one the initial aggressor,136 it is generally accepted that the person who is at
127

Adam Liptak, 15 States Expand Right to Shoot in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, available at
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See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)(i) (2009) (“The actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is in his
or her dwelling”); See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A)(1962) (stating “the actor is not obliged
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aggressor.” See id. § 35.15(2)(a)(1).
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fault for provoking the confrontation is considered to be the initial aggressor.137 Another
common formulation of this restriction on the use of self-defense was stated by the court
in Nowlin v. United States:138 “Appellant had no legitimate claim to the defense of selfdefense since he had voluntarily placed himself in a position which he could reasonably
expect would result in violence.”139
Had John White been the initial aggressor when he left his house carrying a
loaded 32 caliber gun?140 Had he not placed himself in a position that one could expect
to lead to violence? Did Bernhard Goetz not provoke the confrontation when he took out
his gun in the subway?141 Or did the victim of his violence “start the whole thing” by
saying to Goetz, “Give me five dollars”?142 If either John White or Bernhard Goetz were
the initial aggressors, their self-defense claim is inappropriate and invalid.
“Words” are what both John White and Bernhard Goetz claim led them to fear for
their or others safety, and therein provoked the violent response. To John White, the
words said to his son at a party, followed by the words said in a phone call, followed by
words said once White approached the four men with his gun,143 caused him to fear for
his or his son’s safety. Certainly, “fighting words” exist. There are words, as the
Supreme Court held in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,144 which “by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”145
Whereas it might well be maintained by the prosecution that both Goetz and
White were the initial aggressors because they are the ones who introduced the threatened
use of deadly physical force,146 one aspect of the law relating to the initial aggressor does
not seem to apply. New York State law provides that the use of physical force by the
initial aggressor would be justifiable “if the actor has withdrawn from the encounter and
effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in
continuing the incident by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical
force.”147 Once Goetz and White introduced their guns into the scene, there was no
subsequent attempt by them to withdraw their threatened use of deadly force.
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Conclusion
There are direct and strong parallels between the use of deadly physical force by
Bernhard Goetz and John White. Each claimed that he was confronted with a threat from
others that was imminent. Each claimed that his use of a gun to protect himself was
justified. Each claim was made even though there was no weapon used or shown by
those who allegedly were the source of the threat. In both instances, the defendants were
in unlawful possession of their guns. In neither instance, did the defendants retreat after
the initial showing of their weapon. Whereas the defense in the White case clearly and
forcefully told the jurors “[r]ace … is very much a part of this case,”148 counsel for Goetz
was less direct but no less clear.149
The Goetz and White cases were intriguing because they present such critical
challenges to the standard that ought to be used in determining whether an individual has
acted reasonably in using deadly physical force to defend oneself. The crucial issue of
race, especially when used to justify the use of armed force in self-defense, makes the
148

Transcript of Record at 2541, People v. White, No. 2662A-06 (Suffolk County Sup. Ct. Mar. 19, 2008)
(unpublished opinion). During closing arguments, Frederick Brewington elaborated as to the manner in
which race prompted the very incident that occurred on the night of the shooting. Id. at 2541-45.
Brewington explained how Daniel Cicciaro and his friends felt that “they had the right to go to Aaron’s
house … and essentially terrorize the entire family,” because Aaron White was black and Jenny Martin,
whom he allegedly had raped, was white. Id. Upon arrival at the house, Cicciaro and friends questioned
Aaron, saying “Who the f* do you think you are, n*? … I’m going to f* you and your mother.” Id. at 2542.
John White was unfortunately all too familiar with “the Klan … They pull up. They blind you with their
lights. They burn your house. They threaten you. That’s how they come.” Id. at 2543. Brewington
rebutted the claim that race was not a factor in the conflict by emphatically stating that “this case has
everything to do [with] race.” Racial Violence and Self-Defense, 4 Journal of Race, Gender and Ethnicity 2
at 14 (2008) Brewington explained,
[R]ace was key, particularly for this defendant both in speaking from a subjective
standpoint and an objective standpoint. The Issue of race was not only one that was
raised by Mr. White, but that was confirmed by Aaron and the witnesses that the People
put on. The claim that they did not use initially any racial epithets against the White
family became very untrue and disproven through cross-examination. We were able to
get one of the individuals to say we might have said it once or twice. It was a tape of
one of the friends of Daniel Cicero who was in the car with them and the phone had a
call 911 that had been left open, the line was left open, and you heard the individual
saying, Mr. Servano was his name, “don’t worry Danno we are going to get those f*ing
n*” for you.” … Race had everything to do with it in this case. Id.
149
Goetz’s attorney requested the Guardian Angels, a group of young men and women who were strong
supporters of the need for those other than police officers to aggressively respond to street criminals, to
bring to court four black youths to portray the four individuals who were shot by Goetz for a re-enactment
of the crime scene. Mark Baker, Goetz’s attorney, commented, “we got criticized for doing that by the
District Attorney.” See Racial Violence and Self-Defense, 4 Journal of Race, Gender and Ethnicity 2 at 18
(2008). But it’s not as if this re-creation of the crime was needed to remind jurors of the significance of
race. Baker commented, “I had a photograph of each [black] kid blown up … on big posters … three feet
by five feet facing that jury for seven weeks … they were violent photographs and that was the atmosphere
we tried to create.” Id. at 21. When Baker was asked about playing on the racist feelings of the jurors, only
two of whom were black, Baker responded that, “I didn’t create the color of their skins.” Id. at 24.
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resolution of the issues presented in this article both all the more complex and all the
more compelling.
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